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INTRODUCTION

In the United States, the executive branch of government established under Article II of the United States Constitution, has historically perceived itself to be the carrier of national values, domestically
and internationally., The legislative branch of government established
under Article I of the Constitution has been considered the focus for
localized or regional needs.
This national posture of executive power has been periodically challenged in an attempt to determine the parameters of the Faithful
Execution Clause in Article II of the Constitution. The Faithful Execution Clause is the main source of executive power. Beginning with
the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt, in 1933, this clause assumed a dynamic vitality that propelled the work of the executive

*Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.A., 1958, University of Georgia; J.D., 1961,
University of Georgia; L.L.M., 1962, University of Illinois; L.L.M., 1968, Yale University.
1. See generally, Miller, Implications of Watergate: Some Proposalsfor Cutting the Presidency Doum to Size, 2 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 33 (1975)
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branch far beyond what was anticipated by the constitutional framers
of Article II in 1787.2 The Roosevelt administrative agency state implemented executive concepts of "Quality of Life" 3 whether at the
local, regional, national or transnational level. Meanwhile, the Congress, appearing awed by the complexity of the post-technological
environment, seemed to abdicate much of its Article One powers. The
abdication came in the form of congressional cooperation in executive
restructuring. 4 With the abdication of congressional power, the
strength of the executive increased until the present administration
inherited an executive department that had developed far out of proportion despite a built-in system of checks and balances.
One such dramatic area of expansion is the role and scope of presidential power over foreign commerce. The power of the President in
the foreign commerce arena has traditionally been great. However,
so often, the expansion has come at the expense of congressional
constitutional authority. Indeed, as recently as 1975, the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals observed, "Congress, beginning as early
as 1794 and continuing into (the Trade Act of) 1974 has delegated the
exercise of much of the power to regulate foreign commerce to the
Executive."5
Thus, with almost two hundred years of precedents to examine,
this paper will concentrate upon the theories permitting executive
growth, and the impact of that growth upon the role of the President
in the critical area of foreign trade. Next, the paper will examine
certain principles for determining the legality of congressional delegation of authority to the Executive in the foreign commerce arena.
Furthermore, the vitality of these guidelines will be illustrated by an
examination of their use in recent cases. Finally, the paper will apply
those guidelines to the Trade Act of 1974, as amended in 1979, to
determine the legality of the congressional delegation of power and
the constitutionality of the overextended role of the executive in
foreign trade matters.

2. Id. at 45-52.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 48. For an example of the Executive State Out of Constitutional Control, see
Immigration & Naturalization Service v. CHADHA, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
5. United States v. Yoshida International, Inc., 63 C.C.P.A. 15, 526 F.2d 560 (1975). See
also Davidow, Hegemony With a Vengeance: U.S. Trade Law Attacks on Foreign Government
Equity Participationin Exporting Enterprises, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 279 (1986).
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II.

BACKGROUND

To understand the role of the President in foreign commerce first
requires an assessment of the Article III responsibility of the United
6
States Supreme Court.
The conspicuous failure of the Court historically to address the
basic issue of executive power vis-A-vis the Congress may be viewed
as a sub rosa application of the political question doctrine. Generally,
the application of this doctrine is believed to serve at least one of
three functions. First, in its "prudentialist" role, 7 the political question
doctrine permits the Court to avoid emotional issues which are found
to be inexpedient to decide. Second, in its "functionalist" role,8 it
permits the Court to decline to consider issues which lie outside the
Court's traditional competence and which the Constitution, as interpreted by the Court, has relegated to other branches of the government. Finally, in its "classicist" role, 9 the doctrine works to give the
Justices expansive reviewing power by positing a duty to determine
judicially all issues properly placed before the Court. 10 Following the
landmark decision in Baker v. Carr," the Court appeared to adopt a
classicist approach; however, more recently the Supreme Court has
given far greater consideration to "functionalist" and "prudentialist"
values. Prior to an analysis of the substantive effect of the present
Court's application, both overt and sub rosa, of the political question
doctrine, it is necessary to understand the Court's view of the procedural effect of the doctrine on the constitutional issues to which the
doctrine is applied.
Although the political question doctrine is primarily a form of judicial avoidance, similar to "standing" and other related doctrines, its
effect is quite different from avoidance on jurisdictional or procedural
grounds. For example, a denial of certiorariwill not affect the decision
of the lower court, and thus will not preclude the Court's later reso-

6. See generally, Baldwin, The United States Supreme Court: A Creative Check of Institutional Misdirection? 45 IND. L.J. 550 (1970).
7. See generally, - BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); Ligan, Political
Question Doctrine, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1135 (1970). See also United States v. O'Brien 391 U.S.
367 (1968).
8. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1

(1959). See also Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
9. Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE

L.J. 517 (1966). See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Powell v. McCormark, 395 U.S.
486 (1969).
10. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
11. See supra note 9.
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lution of a case involving similar issue and facts. Similarly, lack of
"ripeness" will preclude a constitutional decision, but the same party,
upon a later showing of more concrete interference with protected
rights, may obtain a decision. If avoidance takes the form of lack of
standing or non-adversarialness of the case, the party before the Court
will be unable to raise the constitutional issue, but a "better" party
is not precluded from doing so. In short, all of the traditional forms
of judicial avoidance affect only the individual case, not the constitutional issue.
By contrast, the political question doctrine attaches solely to the
issue presented by the case. 12 An analysis of the most important political questions to reach the Court 13 supports the observation that the
doctrine is not employed merely to avoid individual cases, since all of
these cases reached the Court by way of the discretionary writ of
certiorari. Whereas the traditional procedural grounds for avoidance
present a virtually limitless variety of substantive issues, the political
question doctrine can be defined by reference to a limited number of
questions of substantive law. 14 Once the doctrine attaches to an issue,
precedent and stare decisis operate to prevent a judicial determination
of this issue in any future case.
When the Court employs the procedural technique of abstention,
it nevertheless retains ultimate responsibility for defining and enforcing the constitutional principle at stake. However, when holding a
question "political" rather than "judicial," the Court renounces this
responsibility in favor of other political institutions. Abstention of this
type is not intended to prepare the ground for a more effective vindication of the issue under more auspicious circumstances, but rather
to abdicate the responsibility "to say what the law is.' 15 Such action
by the Court is viewed, under the "classicist" theory, as a dereliction
of the judicial duty to decide cases properly within the jurisdiction of
the Court.
The acme of classicist application of the political question doctrine
was marked by the Court in Baker. Having ruled in Baker that chal-

12. The point of Baker was that the doctrine involves "political questions," not "political
cases." Id.
13. See, e.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S.
160 (1948); Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942);
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
14. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211-226. Justice Brennen delineated the following categories; foreign
relations, dates of duration of hostilities, validity of enactments, the status of Indian tribes,
and republican form of government.
15. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177-178 (1803).
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lenges to malapportioned legislatures presented a justiciable issue, the
Court went a step further when it declined to invoke the political
question doctrine in Bond v. Floyd,16 holding instead that judicial
review of the Georgia Legislature's refusal to seat anti-war activist
Julian Bond was available. Likewise, in Powell v. McCormack,17 the
Court ruled that the political question doctrine did not preclude judicial
review of Congress' refusal to seat Representative Adam Clayton
Powell. In both Bond and Powell, the Court appeared to be following
the expansive course set in Baker, whereby the political question
doctrine was viewed as a product of constitution interpretation, rather
than of judicial discretion.", As Justice Douglas noted in his concurring
opinion in Baker, "[w]here the Constitution assigns a particular function wholly and indivisibly to another department, the federal judiciary
does not intervene,"' 19 but as Bond and Powell indicate, this caveat
does not preclude resolution of issues simply because they are political
innature.
The present trend toward conservatism manifested by the Supreme
Court in recent decisions is indicative of a shift to a more functionalist/
prudentialist construction of the political question doctrine. Thus, in
O'Brien v. Brown,2° where delegates from California and Illinois challenged the recommendations of the Credentials Committee of the
Democratic National Convention 'denying them seating, the Court
stayed the order of the court below. Although citing the availability
of the National Convention as a forum to review recommendations of
the Credentials Committee and the lack of stare decisis as bases for
its ruling, the factor exerting primary influence on the Court was the
"large public interest" in allowing the political processes to function
free from judicial intervention. In holding that the judiciary should
defer directly to the Democratic National Convention and indirectly
to "public interest," the Court was assuming a functionalist/prudentialist posture toward the constitutional issues. Nowhere in its opinion
did the majority point to a specific constitutional provision denying
the Court competence to reach the merits. On the contrary, by implication, the Court seemed to intimate that the complex political nature
of the issues was itself sufficient to warrant judicial avoidance. The

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

385 U.S. 116 (1966).
See supra note 9.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 210-211.
Id. at 246.
409 U.S. 1 (1972).
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Court wanted to avoid the charge of judicial manipulations of party
candidates for the office of President. The Court feared that the ultimate candidate could appear as a "judicial" and not a party choice.
Although the political question doctrine is applicable in cases where
judicial resolution "would lead a court into conflict with one or more
of the coordinate branches of government, ' 21 to hold that it is likewise
applicable in cases involving political processes and parties seems to
ignore the "political" party cases such as Terry v. Adams2 and Smith
v. Allright,23 as well as Baker.
On either "functionalist" or "prudentialist" grounds, the decision
in O'Brien falls outside the parameters of the political question doctrine, both because the power to decide the basic constitutional issues
is not constitutionally delegated to any other branch of government
and because public opinion has not traditionally lacked the competence
to reach the merits of a given case. Certainly the controversiality of
the issue in O'Brien, or for that matter Dames & Moore v. Regan,could not have been more hotly contested than the constitutional questions concerning the Missouri Compromise,2 child labor legislation,26
President Truman's seizure of the steel mills,- or school segregation.?
The Court has shown many times in the past that it will not seek
shelter under the political question doctrine merely because determination of the issue might be unpopular. Likewise, the political question
doctrine has had no place where the Court was presented with conflicting claims of competence among the other departments of government.- Such issues have been decided on their merits even in the
field of the foreign affairs power. 30 The Steel Seizure Case3' and The
Pocket Veto Case 2 confirm the rule of allocation of competence in the

21. Id. at 15.
22. 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
23. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
24. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
25. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 393.
26. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
27. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
28. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
29. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. CHADHA, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)
30. See, e.g., United States v. Guy W. Copps, Inc., 348 U.S. 296 (1955); United States v.
Belmont 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Missouri v. Holland, 352 U.S. 416 (1920). See also Borchard,
Shall The Executive Agreement Replace The Treaty? 53 YALE L.J. (1944), 54 YALE L.J. 616
(1945).
31. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
32. 279 U.S. 655 (1929).
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fields of executive emergency and legislative power. If the Court had
deferred to the claims asserted by one of the conflicting departments,
such a decision would have delegated to that department's general
competence under the Constitution and would have been a constitutional decision of much greater import than a decision on the merits.
When competing claims of competence between the executive and
the legislative branches surface in the Court, the failure of the Court
to define and address the issues is usually a sub rosa application of
the political question doctrine on functionalist grounds. Ultimately,
however, sub rosa applications are stop gap only. Perhaps the Court
has resolved the basic issue by in reality allocating a realistic delegation
of competence not constitutionally anticipated, but in any event, in
the foreign affairs arena, the separation of power between the coordinate branches of government continues to hang in uncertain balance.

III.

THE OBLIGATION OF THE "FAITHFULLY EXECUTE" CLAUSE

In Dames & Moore, the Executive argued that the "faithfully execute" clause of Article II of the Constitution confers the right to
selectively enforce or "harmonize" allegedly conflicting statutes and
foreign policy programs.s
This argument implicitly interprets "faithfully execute" as a grant
of discretion and authority. In fact, the "faithfully execute" clause
should represent a duty to perform rather than a grant of discretion.
The Executive is expected to execute the laws in good faith - not
circumvent the intent of Congress. 34 The concept of faithful execution

33. This statement is not intended as an entry into the Jackson-Roosevelt-Taft debate of a
strong versus a weak executive. Where Congress, as law maker and in the exercise of a
legitimate Constitutional power, has spoken the executive must execute unless a veto is sustained. Where Congress has not spoken to a matter within its constitutional province, the
executive cannot take on the role of legislator by doing what Congress fails or refuses to do.
There does seem to be an exception in the field of foreign affairs. The powers of the executive
as spelled out in Article II have been interpreted to (a) confer specific non-legislative powers;
(b) confer certain types of discretionary powers upon the executive by the legislative branch;
(c) confer certain types of nondiscretionary power upon the executive by the legislative brands
and (d) foreign affairs power that has been surgically grafted onto Article II by the United
States Supreme Court. See, e.g., United States v. Curtis Wright Export, Corp, 299 U.S. 304
(1936); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Nixon v. Administration of General Services,
433 U.S. 425 (1977).
34. See generally R. TUGWELL, THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE PRESIDENCY (1960); W.
TAFT, THE PRESIDENT AND HIS POWERS (1916). But see Curtiss-WrightExport, 299 U.S. at

304 (possible exception for foreign Affairs). See L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1972). However there is no exception to the Faithful Execution clause that
would permit the Executive to assert a doctrine of immunity from for example the suits in
impoundment cases.
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was tested in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,- wherein the
Court, in a series of seven complex opinions, struck down the President's attempted seizure of the steel mills, holding, albeit with a degree
of timidity, that the seizure could not be justified under his constitutional powers. The reason was that in 1947, Congress had rejected
amendments granting power to the President to seize private industries in emergencies;- thus, Congress had expressed its view that it
would prefer to deal with such problems 7itself on an ad hoc basis
pursuant to presidential recommendations.3
In effect, the jurisprudence to emerge from the Steel Seizure Case
was that the President cannot unilaterally do that which he can only
recommend. As Justice Clark concurring argued, "[w]here Congress

Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Train, 489 F.2d 492, 495 (4th Cir. 1973); State Highway Comm'n
v. Volpe, 479 F.2d 1099, 1123 (8th Cir. 1973); Louisana v. Weinberger, 369 F. Supp. 856, 861-62
(E.D. La. 1973); Guadamuz v. Ash, 368 F. Supp. 1233, 1238 (D.D.C. 1973); Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258, 261 (C.D. Cal. 1973); National Council of Community Mental Health
Centers Inc. v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 897, 900 (D.D.C. 1973); Local 2677, AFGE v. Phillips,
358 F. Supp. 60, 68-69 (D.D.C. 1973). But see Housing Authority of San Francisco v. HUD,
340 F. Supp. 654, 656 (N.D. Cal. 1972). San Francisco Redevelopment Agency v. Nixon, 329
F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Cal. 1971). Therefore, it is clear that sovereign immunity claims do not
present a bar to justiciability. Rejection of sovereign immunity is supported by the rationale
that the doctrine is not intended to protect actions outside the law. The doctrine of sovereign
immunity has been continually eroded both through specific waivers, (two major examples of
general waivers of immunity are the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1970), and the Tort Claims
Act of 1946, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970); specific statutes also allow suit against individual
agencies, see, e.g., Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-35 (1970) and a general narrowing
of the doctrine, see, e.g., Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1974); although it is routinely raised
by the Government. See Hearings on "Sovereign Immunity" Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
28-30, 64-75 (1970). See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
35. 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
36. Notably, the prior congressional rejection of the power exercised by President Truman
is directly analogous to the case at abr. In recent action on the public debt, Congress increased
the borrowing power of the Government while rejecting a limit on fiscal 1973 expenditures.
Pub. L. No. 92-599 (Oct. 27, 1972), § 201, 86 Stat. 1324, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG,
& ADMIN. NEWS 1542. Congress specifically voted on and rejected two amendments which
would have given the Executive the discretionary power to impound appropriated funds. 118
CONG. REC. H10282-84 (daily ed. Oct. 18, 1972) Id. at H10224-34, § 18506, 18510, 18512-30
(daily ed. Oct. 17, 1972); Id., H9363-401 (daily ed. Oct. 10 1972). Compare H.R. REP. No. 1614,
92d Cong. 2d Sess. 3-4, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4976-77,
21th H.R. REP. No. 1606, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1972), reprintedin 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN, NEWS 4972-73; see S. REP. No. 1292, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2, 7-9 (1972), reprinted
in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4948-49, 4954-56.
37. Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 60 U.S. at 599-600 (Frankfurter, J., Concurring); see also
93 CON. REC. 3637-45 (1974).
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has laid down specific procedures to deal with the type of crisis confronting the President, he must follow those procedures in meeting
the crisis. . .. "s One point in the Steel Seizure Case appeared to be
clear, and that is when a subject is within the purview of congressional
power, and Congress has acted, the President may not act in contravention of the stated legislative policy. 9 This conclusion of the Court
in the Steel Seizure Case is compatible with the Faithful Execution
Clause of Article II. Reason and precedent dictate that the direction
to "faithfully execute" is not a carte blanche invitation to the President
to implement arbitrarily his agenda for the nation.40 In a memo written
while an Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Chief Justice William Rehnquist reasoned: "[i]t seems an anomalous proposition that because
the executive branch is bound to execute the laws, it is free to decline
to execute them."'4 Further, the Supreme Court has stated: "To contend that the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws
faithfully executed implies a power to forbid their execution is a novel
construction of the Constitution, and entirely inadmissable."42
In the Federal Convention of 1787, the States unanimously rejected
a motion "that the National Executive have a power to suspend any
Legislative act. . .. "- As the Court stated in the Steel Seizure Case,"the President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed
refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker." However, Congress
has allocated such broad powers to the President that the quoted
language the Steel Seizure Case appears to be meaningless within the
context of foreign affairs in general, and foreign commerce in particular, at least when the concept of Inherent Executive Power is considered.

38. Id. at 662.
39. Id. at 586-589.
40. See National Council of Community Mental Health Centers, Inc. v. Weinberqer, 361 F.
Supp. 897, 901 (D.D.C. 1973). See also National Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d
587, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
41. Memo from William Rehnquist reproduced in Joint Hearings on S. 373 Before the Ad
Hoc Subcomm. on Impoundment of Funds of the Senate Comm. on Government Operations
and the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. 390, 394 (1973).
42. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838).
43. H.R.Doc. No. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 152 (1927) (documents illustrative of the Union
of American States).
44. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube, 343 U.S. at 587.
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INHERENT EXECUTIVE POWER

Executives have argued that within the context of foreign affairs
they have inherent power on the basis of the Article II constitutional
provision that "[t]he executive power shall be vested in a President
of the United States of America." In determining the extent of power
inherent in the presidency, three criteria generally exist: (1) the lack
of an express constitutional commitment of power to a coordinate
branch, or of an express prohibition of its exercise by the President;
(2) the historical and customary exercise of a power by the Executive
over a long period of time, coupled with tacit or express congressional
approval; and (3) the existence of a situation that necessitates execu5
tive action for the public interest4
No provision of the Constitution clearly commits foreign affairs
power to a coordinate branch or explicitly prohibits its exercise by
the President.46 Article I of the Constitution vests the legislative power
in the Congress. This implies that Congress alone shall determine
national policy except when: (1) a veto is sustained, (2) a statute is
declared unconstitutional, or (3) the Constitution commits certain
policymaking power to another branch. 47 One of the principal methods
by which Congress can determine national and international policy is
by enacting authorization or appropriation bills. Thus, if the Executive
impounds funds or refuses to spend the money on congressional programs, thereby frustrating the congressional policy underlying the
authorization or appropriation, he clearly usurps the policymaking
power of Congress.48
Where the test is unclear, the standard is whether the practice is
one of long standing and whether action or inaction of Congress has
added a gloss to presidential powers. In United States v. CurtissWriqht Export Corp., 49 the Supreme Court ruled that the President

45. See id. at 585-89; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893); Legal
Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 534-35 (1871).
46. But see, Salomon, The Case Against Impoundment, 2 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 277 (1975).
47. See Levinson & Mills, Impoundment: A Search for Legal Principles, 26 U. FLA. L.
REV. 191, 193 (1974).
48. See, e.g., Louisana V. Weinberger, 369 F. Supp. 856, 864-65 (E.D. La. 1973); Guadamuz
v. Ash, 368 F. Supp. 1233, 1241, 1243-44 (D.D.C. 1973); Community Action Programs Executive
Directors Ass'n of New Jersey, Inc. v. Ash, 365 F. Supp. 1355, 1360-61 (D.N.J. 1973); National
Council of Community Mental Health Centers, Inc. v. Weinberger, 361 F. Supp. 897, 901

(D.D.C. 1973); Oklahoma v. Weinberger, 360 F. Supp. 724, 728 (W.D. Okla. 1973); Local 2677,
AFGE v. Phillips, 358 F. Supp. 60, 76-78 (D.D.C. 1973); Train v. New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975).

49. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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was the nation's representative in foreign affairs and cited prior congressional acts which took cognizance of that fact. In United States
v. Midwest Oil Co., 5° the Court found that even congressional silence
could acknowledge the existence of an executive power. The Court
emphasized, however, that the holding did not "mean that the Executive [could] by his course of action create a power." 51 Thus, even
though an act may continually occur, it may still be unconstitutional.
The public interest factor, the third criterion for recognition of
inherent executive power, applies only to short-term reactions to
3
emergency situations, 52 or where legislative ratification is expected.
However, even a purported "national emergency" is not always sufficient to sustain a claim of inherent power. Recall that in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Court ruled that the President was
not empowered to seize the steel mills in order to maintain production
for the war effort.
Another limitation to inherent power was developed by the Court
in Curtiss-Wright. In Curtiss-Wright the Court recognized that there
must be a distinction between inherent power in the realms of foreign
policy and domestic affairs. The Court noted that inherent power must
be much more restricted in the domestic arena, because the Constitution identifies domestic issues in much greater detail.-4 The distinction
between the President's domestic and foreign affairs powers is meaningful only upon the assumption that certain activities are regarded
as being too remote from foreign affairs.
However, no constitutional authority in the Executive, inherent
or otherwise, grants the power to usurp prerogatives of another branch
or ignore duly enacted laws. The Constitution specifically recognizes
the Executive's role regarding the enactment of laws. And Marbury
v. Madison- established the concept of judical review in all constitutional matters.
Against this background Presidents have assumed powers far
beyond constitutional expectations. In most instances, the Court has
been reluctant to utilize its machinery to resolve the issues. Usually

50. 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
51. Id. at 474. See also, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. at 654.
52. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
53. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915). The new Congressional Budget
and Impoundment Control Act of 1974 has restricted authority to accomplish withholding such
as that accomplished in the instant case.
54. Curtiss-WrightExport, 299 U.S. at 320.

55. 1 U.S. [1 Cranch] 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1813).
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the matter involves congressional delegation of broad power coupled
with an executive agenda far exceeding either congressional delegation
or constitutional authorization.
V.

INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE

The first of many cases involving just such a challenge to the
congressional delegation of power to the President in the foreign commerce area was The Aurora v. United States.56 The case came up on
an appeal from the District Court of New Orleans condemning the
British cargo of the brig Aurora imported in violation of an 1809 trade
act. 57 The case involved the right of Congress to enact legislation
which predicated the revival of an expired law upon a proclamation
by the President. It was argued that this procedure amounted to an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative powers. In upholding the act,
the Supreme Court stated:
We can see no sufficient reason, why the legislature should
not exercise its discretion in reviving the act of March 1st,
1809, either expressly or conditionally, as their judgment
should direct. The 19th section of that act, declaring that it
should continue in force to a certain time, and no longer,
could not restrict their power of extending its operation,
without limitation upon the occurrence of any subsequent
combination of events. 58
Field v. Clark59 involved a suit brought by importers to obtain a
refund of duty which they claimed had been illegally exacted upon
imported merchandise under the Tariff Act of 1890. The plaintiffs
charged, inter alia, that section 3 of the act was an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative and treaty-making powers. The section provided:
That with a view to secure reciprocal trade with countries
producing the following articles ... whenever, and so often
as the President shall be satisfied that the Government of
any country producing . . . such articles, imposes duties or
other exactions upon the agricultural or other products of
the United States, which in view of the free introduction of

56. 11 U.S. [7 Cranch] 382 (1813).
57. Id. at 383.
58. Id. at 384.

59. 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
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. . . [such articles] into the United States he may deem to
be reciprocally unequal and unreasonable, he shall have the
power and it shall be his duty to suspend, by proclamation
to that effect, the provisions of this act relating to the free
introduction of... [such articles] for such time as he shall
deem just, and in such case and during such suspension
duties shall be levied, collected, and paid upon . . . [such
articles].After reviewing the acts, the first of which was passed during the
Washington administration, the Court stated:
It would seem to be unnecessary to make further reference
to acts of Congress to show that the authority conferred
upon the President by the third section of the act of October
1, 1890, is not an entirely new feature in the legislation of
Congress, but has the sanction of many precedents in legislation. While some of these precedents are stronger than
others, in their application to the case before us, they all
show that, in the judgment of the legislative branch of the
government, it is often desirable, if not essential, for the
protection of the interests of our people, against the unfriendly or discriminating regulations established by foreign
governments, in the interests of their people, to invest the
President with large discretion in matters arising out of the
execution of statutes relating to trade and commerce with
other nations. If the decision in the case of The Brig Aurora
had never been rendered, the practical construction of the
Constitution, as given by so many acts of Congress, and
embracing almost the entire period of our national existence,
should not be overruled, unless upon a conviction that such
legislation was clearly incompatible with the supreme law of
the land. 61
The Court concluded with a principle that has been a part of constitutional jurisprudence ever since: "That Congress cannot delegate
legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized
as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government
ordained by the Constitution."-

60. Id. at 652.
61. Id. at 656 [emphasis added].
62. Id.
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In 1927 the Supreme Court again had an opportunity to consider
this issue. In J.W. Hampton, Jr.& Co. v. United States,63 the plaintiff
had imported barium dioxide assessed at six cents per pound, two
cents more than was provided for by the Tariff Act of 1922. The
increase had been levied pursuant to a proclamation by the President
issued by virtue of section 315 of the act. The act provided, inter alia,
that the United States Tariff Commission should assist the President
in determining the rates of duty by undertaking investigations. Furthermore, the act stated that no proclamation should be issued until
the investigations had been completed. The Customs Court sustained
the rate of duty increase by the proclamation of the President. The
Court of Customs Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court, in upholding the judgment, concluded:
If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible
principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such
rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a
forbidden delegation of legislative power. If it is thought
wise to vary the customs duties according to changing conditions of production at home and abroad, it may authorize
the Chief Executive to carry out this purpose, with the advisory assistance of a Tariff Commission appointed under
congressional authority. This conclusion is amply sustained
by a case in which there was no advisory commission furnished the President - a case to which this Court gave the
fullest consideration nearly 40 years ago.4
In Curtiss-WrightExport Corp., the Court considered a joint resolution of Congress which gave the President power to prohibit by
proclamation the sale of arms to certain South American countries if
he found that such prohibition would contribute to the re-establishment
of regional peace.- The resolution was attacked as an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power, and in discussing that allegation, the
Supreme Court stated:
Practically every volume of the United States Statutes contains one or more acts or joint resolutions of Congress authorizing action by the President in respect of subjects affecting foreign relations, which either leave the exercise of the

63. 276 U.S. 294 (1927).
64. Id. at 410.
65. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 302, 304 (1936).
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power to his unrestrictedjudgment, or provide a standard
far more general than that which has always been considered
requisite with regard to domestic affairs . . . and while this
Court may not, and should not, hesitate to declare acts of
Congress, however many times repeated, to be unconstitutional if, beyond all rational doubt, it finds them to be so,
an impressive array of legislation, such as we have just set
forth, enacted by nearly every Congress from the beginning
of our national existence to the present day, must be given
unusual weight in the process of reaching a correct determination of the problem. A legislative practice such as we have
here, evidenced not by only occasional instances, but marked
by the movement of a steady stream for a century and a
half of time, goes a long way in the direction of proving the
presence of unassailable ground for the constitutionality of
the practice, to be found in the origin and history of the
power involved, or in its nature, or in both combined.The decisions of the Supreme Court in this area appear to follow
a discernible, though at times confusing, pattern. Nevertheless, the
principles established in these decisions are the fundamental guides
in ascertaining whether Congress and the President have adhered to
all relevant constitutional limitations.
VI.

ADDUCTION OF PRINCIPLES FROM THE CASE LAW

The first principle found in the case law is that all permissible
congressional delegation of power to the Executive occur in the field
of foreign commerce or other foreign affairs. Thus, any delegation of
such authority will be given great deference by the courts. As the
Supreme Court said in a 1974 decision, "[t]he plenary authority of
Congress to regulate foreign commerce, and to delegate significant
portions of this power to the Executive, is well established. ' 67
A more recent example of such deference is Florsheim Shoe Co.
v. United States,6 wherein petitioner, a domestic manufacturer of
footwear, challenged the congressional delegation of power to the President under the Trade Act of 1974 as unconstitutional. The Court
stated: "[c]ongressional authorizations of presidential power [in the
foreign commerce area] should be given a broad construction and not
'hemmed in' or 'cabined, cribbed, confined' by anxious judicial blin-

66. Id. at 327-328 [emphasis added].
67. California Bankers Ass'n. V. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
68. 744 F.2d 787 (Fed Cir. 1984).
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ders."69 The principle is again well illustrated in United States Cane
Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. Block. 70 In that case, petitioners also challenged the delegation of authority to the Executive by Congress to
raise the duty costs on raw sugar imports. The Court noted:
As aptly observed by Chief Judge Re in his recent decision,
Bar Zel Expenditers, Inc. a/c Ben Clements & Sons, Inc.
v. United States, 3 CIT-, Slip Op. 82-25, 544 F.Supp. 868
(1982): "It is pertinent that there is a long history in the
field of international commerce for Congress to delegate
power to the President to carry out legislative policy." See
J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United . 276 U.S. 394 (1928);
Field v. Clark 143 U.S. 649 (1892) .... [T]his court, therefore, must accord appropriatedeference to Presidentialaction which finds authority in specific statutes. In the recent
case of Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443
(1978), in which the Supreme Court upheld a determination
by the Treasury Department that a remission of a certain
Japanese tax was not a bounty or grant within the purview
of section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, the
Court, quoting Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965),
stated: "When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the intepretation
given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its

administration. "71
Finally, in South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. Trading Corp. v. United
States,72 the Court, relied on Curtis-Wright and dismissed a challenge
of unconstitutional congressional delegation of power to the President
in the foreign commerce arena. The Court stated:
The presence of foreign factors adds still more to the range
of the powers transmitted by the phrase because, as the
Supreme Court has explicitly recognized, a delegation of unusually extensive discretion to the President is not uncommon in the external realm.
In the external sector of the national life, Congress does
not ordinarily bid the President's hands so tightly that he

69.
(1964),
70.
71.
72.

Id. at 793 (quoting South Puerto Rico Sugar Co. v. United States 334 F.2d 622, 632
cert denied, 379 U.S. 964 (1965)).
544 F. Supp. 883 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
Id. at 894 (emphasis added).
334 F.2d 622 (Ct. Claims, 1964).
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cannot respond promptly to changing conditions or the fluctuating demands of foreign policy. 73
It is clear that the first of the recurring principles, i.e. that of
judicial deference to most congressional delegation of authority to the
President in the foreign commerce arena, is at work today but it is
not without limits. The limitations on such congressional delegation is
the focus of the second major recurring principle, that of an express
policy or objective for the President to execute.
Congress must establish a standard or "intelligible principle" that
makes clear when presidential action is proper. 74 The congressional
standard in theory should confine the President's discretion and
guarantee that any authorized action will tend to promote rather than
to circumvent the legislative purpose. However, it is "not necessary
that the guides be precise."-7 In Mast76 the district court, interpreting
the language of the Agriculture Act of 1956, concluded:
Statutes granting broad discretion to the President to implement trade agreements are common, and they often contain
language similar to that in Section 204. See, e.g., Section
201(a) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, U.S.C. § 1821(a),
That section provides:
(a) Whenever the President determines that any existing
duties or other import restrictions of any foreign country or
the United States are unduly burdening and restricting the
foreign trade of the United States and that any of the purposes stated in section 1801 of this title will be promoted
thereby, the President may (1) after June 30, 1962, and before July 1, 1967, enter
into trade agreements with foreign countries or instrumentalities thereof; and
(2) proclaim such modification or continuance of any
existing duty or other import restriction, such continuance of existing duty-free or excise treatment, or
such additional import restrictions, as he determines to
be required or appropriate to carry out any such trade
agreement.

73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
See Starkist Foods, Inc. v. United States, 275 F.2d 472 479 (CCPA, 1959).
Id. at 473.
596 F. Supp. 1567 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
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(b) Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no
proclamation pursuant to subsection (a) of this section shall
be made (1) decreasing any rate of duty to a rate below 50
percent of the rate existing on July 1, 1962; or
(2) increasing any rate of duty to (or imposing) a rate
more than 50 percent above the rate existing on July 1,
1934. 77
Once a federal court determines that such a policy or objective has
been provided in the relevant statute, the President's action is unreviewable.
In Florsheim Shoe, the Court noted that the purpose of the legislation was, through trade agreements, to foster mutual trade benefits.
The Court pointed out that:
It is now well established by a long line of authorities that
the exercises of broad discretionary authority delegated by
Congress to the President in the sphere of international
trade, where the President is acting essentially as an agent
of Congress, is reviewable by the courts only to determine
whether the President's action falls within his delegated authority, whether the statutory language has been properly
construed, and whether the President's action conformed
with procedural requirement (if any). Neither the President's
findings of fact nor his motivations may be inquired into by
the judiciary. 7

Concerning review of the Executive's findings and exercise of
discretion as an agent of Congress, the following observations of
the Appellate Term of the former Customs Court in Ellis K.
Orlowitz Co. v. United States, 47 Cust.Ct. 583, 585, A.R.D. 136,
200 F.Supp. 302, 305 (1961), affd 50 CCPA 36, C.A.D. 816 (1963),
are pertinent:
Congress can, and often does, delegate to the President, or other executive officer or agency, authority to
make findings in prescribed situations, and, on the basis
of such findings, to promulgate orders. This is a permissible delegation of legislative authority to the executive
branch of our Government. It is axiomatic that courts
77. Id.
78. Florsheim Shoe Co. v. United States, 570 F. Supp. 734, 743 (Ct. Int'l Trade, 1983).
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are not to review the discretion exercised by the President, or other executive officer or agency, in arriving
at findings in such matters. Citation of authority is not
necessary to support this well-recognized rule, requiring
judicial noninterference in legislative authority constitionally conferred by Congres on the Executive. 79
From the foregoing it is suggested that the two major principles
adduced from the case law are still viable today. However, the application of these principles to the Trade Act of 1974 demonstrates congressional and judicial deference to an executive agenda often at odds
with constitutional principles.

VII.

THE TRADE ACT OF

19741°

In Florsheim Shoe,"' the authority of the President to act under
section 504(a) of the Trade Act of 1974 (hereinafter "Trade Act") was
challenged. Petitioner challenged as unconstitutional the denial of duty
free treatment of certain leather goods pursuant to the Trade Act.
Section 504(a) declares:

79. Id. at 743.
80. Although this is a trade it is certainly a powerful political weapon in the President's
hands. Witness Proclamation No. 5610 lifting sanctions from Poland.
February 19,1987
RESTORATION OF THE APPLICATION OF COLUMN 1 RATES OF

DUTY

OF THE

TARIFF SCHEDULES OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE PRODUCTS OF POLAND

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

A PROCLAMATION
1. On October 27, 1982, by Proclamation No. 4991, I suspended the application
of column 1 rates of duty of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS) to
the products of Poland. This followed from my determination that the Government
of the Polish People's Republic had failed to meet certain import commitments
under its Protocol of Accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(19 UST 4331), and that the Polish martial law government had increased its
repression of the Polish people, leaving the United States without any reason to
continue withholding action on its trade complaints against Poland.
2. Since issuance of that Proclamation, the Polish Government has taken steps
that lead me to believe that Poland should be given a renewed opportunity to
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The President may withdraw, suspend, or limit the application of the duty-free treatment accorded under section 2461
of this title with respect to any article or with respect to
any country; except that no rate of duty may be established
in respect of any article pursuant to this section other than
the rate which would apply but for this subchapter. In taking
any action under this subsection, the President shall consider
the factors set forth in sections 2561 and 2462(c) of this title.
The Court in Florsheim Shoe agreed with the lower court's interpretation of this subchapter as "an explicit grant to the President of
plenary authority - just as the statutory text indicates - to 'withdraw, suspend, or limit' the [Generalized System of Preferences,
"GSP"] duty free treatment after consideration of the factors in sections 501 and 502(c). '" This broad, discretionary reading is fully supported by the legislative history. The House Report says with respect
to the provision which became section 504(a):

address its trade obligations with the benefit of most-favored-nation tariff treatment.
3. The President may, pursuant to his constitutional and statutory authority,
including Section 125(b) of the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, terminate in whole
or in part Proclamation No. 4991.
4. I have determined in this case that the national interest requires expeditious
action.

Now,

THEREFORE,

I,

RONALD REAGAN,

President of the United States of

America, by the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes of
the United States, including, but not limited to, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,
as amended, and the Trade Act of 1974, as amended, do hereby proclaim as follows:
1. Proclamation No. 4991 of October 27, 1982, is hereby revoked.
2.
General Headnote 3(d) of the TSUS is modified:
(a) by deleting "or pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 4991, dated
October 27, 1982" and
(b) by deleting "Polish People's Republic from the list of countries therein.
3. This Proclamation shall take effect with respect to articles entered, or
withdrawn from warehouse for consumption, on or after the date of publication of
this Proclamation in the Federal Register.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this nineteenth day of
February, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and eighty-seven, and of the
Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and eleventh.
RONALD REAGAN

81. Florsheim Shoe Co., 570 F. Supp. at 734.
82. Id. at 793.
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The President would be authorized to withdraw, suspend,
or limit preferences at any time with respect to any article
or any beneficiary developing country. In taking such action,
the President would be required to consider the factors taken
into account in granting preferential treatment initially and
in designating beneficiary countries.
(Emphasis added.) H.R.Rep. No 571, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.CODE CONG. & Ad. NEWS
7186, 7355-56. In contrast, the next paragraph of the legislative history, describing the future section 504(c), sharply
limits the Executive's discretion:
The President would be required to withdraw or suspend
preferential treatment from any country which ceases to be
eligible under the requirements of section 502(b). . . . The
competitive need formula is in general designed to provide
an express requirement governing the withdrawal or suspension of preferential treatment in those cases where it can no
longer be justified . . . . (emphasis added.) Id. at 7356-57.
Use of the term "may" (in section 504(a)) in the phrase
"The President may withdraw, suspend, or limit preferences. .... " likewise strongly indicated that Congress granted
the President broad discretion to take the described actions.
See Southern Railroad Co. v. Seaboard Allied Milling Corp.,
442 U.S. 444, 455, (1979).8
Petitioner in Florsheim Shoe also challenged Congress' delegation
of authority to the President as an unconstitutional use of its commerce
power.- The Court responded:
In this instance Congress has in fact circumscribed the President's discretionary authority under section 504(a) with general guidelines for its exercise. Prior to taking action under
that section, the President must consider the factors set
forth in sections 501 and 502(c). See supra note 8. In addition,
the President's authority under section 504(a) is limited although he may withdraw preferential treatment entirely,
he may not adjust rates of duty. He is also required to report
to Congress pursuant to section 505. These restrictions are
certainly adequate to insure that the statute is not an improper delegation of legislative authority. See United States v.

83. Id.

84. Id. at 794.
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Yoshida International, Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 582-83 (CCPA
1975).8 5
Once determined to have appropriate boundries within which to
operate, executive action pursuant to a lawful delegation of authority
by Congress is not reviewable by the judiciary unless other constitutional principles are implicated.
Thus, in determining the validity of the congressional delegation
of power to the President, the FlorsheimShoe Court applied the first
principle developed from the case law, did the congressional delegation
contained a general purpose or policy to avoid granting the President
unfettered discretion. The court found that it did.86 The Court then
discussed the second principle and found that the Trade Act concerned
foreign affairs. 7
Finally, the court noted: "[a]bove all, we must remember that this
is a statute giving broad discretionary authority to the President in
a field trenching very closely upon foreign affairs and on our relations
''
with other countries.
In summary, it does seem that the two major principles or
guidelines that courts will use to determine whether congressional
delegation of authority to the Executive is constitutional are:
1) the delegation contains some type of policy or objective which
caps the discretion of the President by setting outer parameters within
which he must work, and
2) the delegation must relate to foreign affairs or commerce.
Using these two criteria, the Court has struck down nearly every
challenge of unconstitutional delegation of authority to the President
in the foreign commerce arena for the past 180 years. The case law
indicates no change in the future.
VIII.

TREATY POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

An analysis of the external powers of the President would not be
complete without an examination of the constitutional power of the
President to enter into treaties.
The constitutional provisions relevant to this discussion are:
Article II, section 2: He [the President] shall have power,
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make

85. Id.
86. Id. at 796.

87. Id. at 793.
88. Id. at 795.
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treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur
Article I, section 9: No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law ....
Article IV, section 3: The Congress shall have power to
dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United
States ....
Article VI: This Constitution, and the laws of the United
States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all
treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land
Under Article II, the treaty-making power is vested exclusively
with the Chief Executive and the Senate. Upon ratification, Article
VI declares a treaty to be the supreme law of the land. Judicial
construction under Article VI, however, appears to limit the treatymaking power where an act of Congress is required to put the treaty
into operation. The central issue is whether the treaty is self-executing
or requires enabling legislation.
In Foster v. Neilson,9° Chief Justice John Marshall stated:
A treaty is, in its nature, a contract between two nations,
not a legislative act. It does not generally effect, of itself,
the object to be accomplished; especially, so far as its operation is infra-territorial; but is carried into execution by the
sovereign power of the respective parties to the instrument.
In the United States, a different principle is established.
Our Constitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land.
It is, consequently, to be regarded in courts of justice as
equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates
of itself, without the aid of any legislative provision. But
when the terms of the stipulation import a contract when
either of the parties engages to perform a particular act,
the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the judicial
department; and the legislature must execute the contract,
before it can become a rule for the court. 9 1

89. See generally Henry, When is a Treaty Self-Executing, 27 MICH. L. REV. 776 (1929).
See also Kennedy, Treaty Interpretation by the Executive Branch: The ABM Treaty and "Star
Wars" Testing and Development, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 854 (1986).
90. 27 U.S. (2 Peters) 253, 314 (1829).
91. 24 Fed. 344, Case (1852) No. 14, 251, at 245-46.
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The doctrine of Foster v. Neilson was again recognized in
Turner v. American Baptist Missionary Union:9
A treaty under the Federal Constitution is declared to be
the supreme law of the land. This, unquestionably, applies
to all treaties, where the treaty-making power, without the
aid of Congress, can carry it into effect. It is not, however,
and cannot be the supreme law of the land, where the concurrence of Congress is necessary to give it effect. Until
this power is exercised, as where the appropriation of the
money is required, the treaty is not perfect. It is not operative, in the sense of the Constitution, as money cannot be
appropriated by the treaty-making power. This results from
the limitations of our government. The action of no department of the government can be regarded as a law until it
shall have all the sanctions required by the Constitution to
make it such.When the subject matter of a treaty involves a power, which under
the Constitution has been specifically delegated to the Congress, ratification by an act of Congress is necessary to bring the treaty into
operation and effect. Under this judicial treatment a treaty does not
become the supreme law of the land until ratified by the full legislative
body.- An example of a specific delegation is the appropriations clause
in Article I. A treaty requiring appropriations also requires an act of
Congress.9 5 There appears however, to be at least one instance in
which appropriations were not made by the Congress.9
Under Article IV, Congress has the authority to dispose of and
regulate property belonging to the United States. This power is not
contingent upon the exercise of sovereign rights over the property.9
The authority of the President and Senate to dispose of United States
property by treaty, without the consent of the entire Congress, is a
less settled question than the appropriation power under Article I. In
Parker v. Duff,98 the Court held that Article IV required an act of

92. See Anderson, The Extent and Limitations of The Treaty Making Power under The
Constitution, 1 AM. J. INT'L L. 636, 644-645 (1907).
93. See Prevost v. Breneaux, 19 How. L.J. 7 (1856).
94. See Stone, The House of Representatives and The Treaty- Making Power, 17 Ky. L.J.
216, 235 (1929). But see Feidler & Dwan, The Extent of the Treaty-Making Power, 28 GEO.
L.J. 184, 192 (1939) for a different interpretation of Art. I, § 9.
95. See Vermilya-Brown Co. v. G. W. Connell, 335 U.S. 377 (1948).
96. 47 Cal. 554 (1874).
97. 17 U.S. (Wall.) 211 (1872).
98. For a general discussion, see Anderson, supra note 92, at 652-53.
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Congress to dispose of land under a treaty. However, in Holden v.
Joy,99 in dicta, the Court indicated that the President and Senate
could convey title to land under the treaty-making power without
congressional consent. 100
The constitutional issues as developed in the case law revolve
around the assertion by the House that where the Constitution grants
the power to Congress to deal with the subject matter, it cannot be
divested of this authority by the treaty-making power. In other words,
ratification of a treaty is within the discretion of the full legislative
body. Conversely, under Article VI, a treaty once ratified pursuant
to Article II becomes the supreme law of the land, thus imposing an
obligation upon the Congress to enact enabling legislation to give
effect to the treaty. These questions have not been directly answered
by the United States Supreme Court. The unresolved issues seem to
center on the following questions: Is the House under a moral or
constitutional obligation to enact appropriate legislation? Can it exercise its discretion, if such exists, and refuse to provide enabling legislation? If there is no congressional discretion in regard to treaty-making functions, then does this not upset the balance of powers which
pervade our constitutional scheme? If the role of Congress in these
matters consists merely of a perfunctory rubber-stamping of executive
decisions, then what will provide the safeguards and checks on that
discretion as the subject matter of treaties encroaches upon domestic
rights and privileges?o1
The Supreme Court continues to skirt the issues presented through
the political question mechanism. It does seem that the more prevelant
view supports the supremacy clause impact upon treaties and, hence,
legislative implementation should flow therefrom.

99. The major concern behind the proposed amendment which would alter the treaty-making
power was due to the signing of the U.N. charter. See Chafee, Stop Being Terrified of Treaties:
Stop Being Scared of the Constitution, 38 A.B.A. J. 431 (1952) and the reply, Deutsch, The
Need For a Treaty Amendment: A Restatement of a Reply, 38 A.B.A. J. 735 (1952). For
consideration of the possibility of domestic interference from the grant of powers to a foreign
nation under a treaty, see Deutsch, Eminent Domain Under a Treaty: A Hypothetical Sup.
Ct. Opinion, 43 A.B.A. J. 699 (1957); Ely, Note, Eminent Domain Under a Treaty, 44 A.B.A.
J. 751 (1958) (a reply to Deutsch).

100. See generally, L.

HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION

37-65 (1972).

See also Baldwin, A Commentary on Nuclear Weapons and ConstitutionalLaw, in NUCLEAR
WEAPON AND LAw 24 (Miller & Feinrider ed. 1984).
101. See generally, Annual Survey of Developments In International Trade Law, 15 GA.
INTN'L & COMP. L.J. 474 (1986); Davidow, Hegemony With a Vengence: U.S. Trade Law
Attacks on Foreign Government Equity Participationin Exporting Enterprises, 24 COLUM.
TRANS.

L.J. 277 (1986).
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CONCLUSION

Although the Constitution begins with an identification of the powers in Congress, the caselaw suggests that the "law" of foreign relations including foreign trade begins with the President. The "law",
however, is so complex that in recent years the executive branch of
government has deferred to the legislative for guidance and support.
To date, the combination of legislation, treaties, and agreements results in an allocation of power never envisioned by the constitutional
framers.
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